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Knowledge: The Safe-Apt View
Abstract
According to virtue epistemology, knowledge involves cogni-
tive success that is due to cognitive competence. This paper
explores the prospects of a virtue theory of knowledge that, so
far, has no takers in the literature. It combines features from a
couple of different virtue theories: like Pritchard’s (2010; Forth-
coming) view, it qualifies as what I call an “impure” version of
virtue epistemology, according to which the competence condi-
tion is supplemented by an additional (safety) condition; like
Sosa’s (2007; Forthcoming) view, it construes the because rela-
tion at issue in the competence condition in terms of compe-
tence manifestation. I argue that this virtue epistemology can
steer clear of a number of old and new problems that arise for
its rivals on both sides.
Keywords: Knowledge; virtue epistemology; safety
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1 Introduction
The core thesis of virtue epistemology is that knowledge involves
cognitive success that is due to cognitive competence. More specifi-
cally, according to virtue epistemology:
VE. One knows that p only if one believes p and the acquisition
and/or retention of one’s true belief that p is (sufficiently) due
to cognitive competence or ability.
VE is a promising view that has a number of prominent support-
ers including Ernest Sosa (e.g. 2007; Forthcoming), John Greco (e.g.
2003; 2010), and Duncan Pritchard (e.g. 2010; Forthcoming). How-
ever, champions of VE disagree on how to best spell out the view in
detail. To begin with there is the question of the nature the cognitive
competences or abilities at issue in VE. However, I do not want to dis-
cuss this question in any detail here. Instead, I will assume, in line
with the major champions of VE, that cognitive competences/abilities
are dispositions to form beliefs that, at least in certain circumstances,
are bound (or highly likely) to be true.
Another question, and one that will be of importance in this pa-
per, concerns how to spell out the because or due to relation at issue
in VE. As far as I am aware, virtue epistemologists are divided into
two main camps on this question. On the one hand there are those
who think that the because relation is spelled out in terms of explana-
tory salience or creditability (Greco, Pritchard) and those who prefer an
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account in terms of the manifestation of competence (Sosa).1
Finally, it may be asked whether knowledge requires satisfac-
tion of further conditions besides VE’s competence condition. Here
we can distinguish between pure virtue epistemologists (Greco and
Sosa) who answer this question in the negative and their competitors,
whom I will call impure virtue epistemologists (such as Pritchard)
who think that we need to place additional conditions on knowledge
(in the case of Pritchard a safety condition).
Here, then, is a table with the options and their most prominent
takers:
creditability/
explanatory salience competence manifestation
pure Greco Sosa
impure Pritchard
The aim of this paper is to explore the prospects for the view that
falls in the unoccupied field. More specifically, I want to suggest
that combining an impure virtue epistemology that, like Pritchard’s,
features an additional safety condition with a Sosa-style competence-
manifestation account of the because relation can avoid a number of
problems that beset its competitors. But in order to get there, some
1 The question remains, how exactly these accounts spell out the because rela-
tion and how they relate to each other. I will get back to this in due course.
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work needs to be done first.
2 Pure creditability virtue epistemology
2.1 . . . in outline
Let’s start with pure creditability virtue epistemology (PC). Obvi-
ously, for the competence condition to stand any chance of passing
the right verdicts in Gettier cases, believing the truth must be strongly
creditable to agent competence. Following Pritchard (2010: 27), I will
for now assume that it must be primarily so creditable. Accordingly,
we get:
PC. One knows that p just in case one truly believes that p and
the acquisition and/or retention of one’s true belief that p is
primarily creditable to one’s competence or ability.
2.2 . . . in trouble
Pritchard (2010; Forthcoming) and Jennifer Lackey (2007; 2009) have
argued that PC faces a serious problem. I will here follow Pritchard’s
presentation, partly because I want to argue that Pritchard’s own
view eventually falls prey to the very same problem. To see how it
arises consider first the following two cases:
Fake Barns. Grover drives through the countryside, sees a barn in
the field to the right and comes to believe, truly, that he is fac-
ing a barn. Unbeknownst to Grover, he is looking at the only
real barn in a field otherwise full of barn façades that are so
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cleverly constructed as to be indistinguishable from real barns
from Grover’s position on the road.
Landmark. Rosita arrives at the train station in an unfamiliar city
and asks the first passer-by how to get to a famous landmark.
Her interlocutor is a knowledgeable resident of the city who
provides her with impeccable directions and Rosita forms the
corresponding true beliefs.
Regarding Fake Barns, Pritchard observes that, intuitively, Grover’s
belief doesn’t qualify as knowledge. At the same time, argues Prit-
chard, Grover’s belief is primarily creditable to his barn-spotting
competence. If Pritchard is right about this, we have a case in which,
intuitively, the agent doesn’t know but satisfies PC’s competence con-
dition on knowledge. PC threatens to be too weak.2 As opposed to
that, regarding Landmark, intuition has it that the testimony-based
beliefs about the directions to the landmark Rosita forms in this situ-
ation qualify as knowledge. However, Pritchard argues that the truth
of Rosita’s beliefs is not primarily creditable to her competences—if
anything it’s primarily creditable to the competences of the knowl-
edgeable resident. If Pritchard is right, we also have a case in which,
intuitively, the agent knows but doesn’t satisfy PC’s competence con-
dition. PC threatens to be too strong.3
With the two problem cases for PC in play, Pritchard states what
I will call “the core problem” for PC in the following passage:
2 For details see Pritchard et al. (2010: ch. 2.5). For reservations about the
intuition of ignorance in Fake Barns see Millikan (1984).
3 For details see Pritchard et al. (2010: ch. 2.6). For reservations about the
cogency of the Landmark-based argument against PC see Riggs (2009).
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[T]he [Rosita] and [Grover] cases collectively pose a quite
formidable difficulty. For notice that while the [Grover]
case puts pressure on the proponent of [PC] to strengthen
her account of knowledge so that it excludes knowledge
in this case, the [Rosita] case puts pressure on the propo-
nent of [PC] to weaken her account. Thus, the two types
of case pull this account of knowledge in two opposing
directions, with the potential of collectively pulling the
view asunder. For if you strengthen the view in order to
deal with the [Grover] case then you face an even tougher
problem when it comes to the [Rosita] case; and if you
weaken the view in order to deal with the [Rosita] case
then you face an even tougher problem when it comes to
the [Grover] case. (Pritchard Forthcoming: 18)
Crucially, the core problem does not arise from Fake Barns or
Landmark considered individually. Pritchard effectively concedes that
champions of PC can get either case right (that is, if they are pre-
pared to construe the view in sufficiently strong or weak a manner).
Instead, the problem arises from the two cases considered in conjunc-
tion. The point is that while PC may be able to handle either of the
two cases, it cannot get both of them right.4
4 Lackey (e.g. 2009: 33-34) makes in essence the same point.
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3 Impure creditability virtue epistemology
3.1 . . . in outline
Pritchard thinks that his preferred view, a version of impure creditabi-
lity virtue epistemology that, in addition, places a safety condition on
knowledge (IC+S), can avoid this problem. In order to see how, let’s
first take a closer look at how Pritchard states his view:
IC+S. Knowledge is safe belief that arises out of the reliable cognitive
traits that make up one’s cognitive character [i.e., in my termi-
nology, that arises out of competence or ability], such that one’s
cognitive success is to a significant degree creditable to [i.e., in
my terminology, sufficiently due to] one’s cognitive character.5
By placing an additional safety condition on knowledge, Pritchard
gives up on pure virtue epistemology in favour of an impure alter-
native. In principle, this is just the kind of move that promises to
avoid the problem he charged PC with. If the safety condition can
be made to handle Fake Barns, the competence condition can be con-
strued weakly enough to allow that Rosita satisfies it. Unsurpris-
ingly, this is exactly what Pritchard aims for. The safety condition
rules against error at nearby possible worlds. It is violated in Fake
Barns. After all, at some nearby worlds Grover looks at a barn façade.
Since the façades are so cleverly constructed as to be indistinguish-
able from real barns from Grover’s position on the road, at those
5 Pritchard et al. (2010: 54). For Pritchard’s argument why knowledge should
have this hybrid structure, see Pritchard (Forthcoming: sect. 5). For an alternative
see section 6.
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worlds, Grover still comes to believe, but now falsely, that he is fac-
ing a barn. Grover’s belief is thus unsafe. Hence, IC+S passes the
right verdict in Fake Barns.
At the same time, compared to PC, Pritchard weakens the compe-
tence condition on knowledge. Recall that, according to PC, knowl-
edge requires that the truth of one’s belief be primarily creditable to
one’s competence. As opposed to that, IC+S’s competence condi-
tion requires creditability to a lesser degree: to satisfy IC+S’s compe-
tence condition, truth need not be primarily creditable to competence.
Rather, all that is needed is that truth be to a significant degree cred-
itable to the agent’s competences.
Moreover, Pritchard argues that Rosita satisfies the competence
condition so understood:
[I]t is of some credit to [Rosita] that she has a true belief
in this case. It is, after all, a person that she asks for direc-
tions, and not, say, a lamp-post or a dog. Moreover, the
person she asks is not a small child, or someone who one
might reasonably expect to be unreliable on this score (e.g.
someone who is clearly a tourist). In addition, if the tes-
timony which [Rosita] received were obviously false, then
we would expect her to be sensitive to this fact. If, for
example, the informant told her that she should get back
on the train and go home to New York, then we would
expect her to treat these directions as entirely spurious.
(Pritchard et al. 2010: 41).
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It becomes clear that Rosita’s cognitive competences make some con-
tribution to her cognitive success. While, given the involvement of
the knowledgeable resident, the contribution may not be enough to
render her cognitive success primarily creditable to her competences,
the thought is that it is enough to render it to a significant degree so
creditable. As a result, Rosita satisfies IC+S’s competence condition
on knowledge.
3.2 . . . in trouble
It may thus appear plausible that IC+S can avoid the problem PC
encounters. Unfortunately, as I am about to argue, closer scrutiny
reveals that appearances are misleading. In fact, the very same prob-
lem reappears for IC+S. In order to see this, I would first like to look
at the kind of case Pritchard takes to motivate the competence com-
ponent of IC+S:
Broken Thermometer. Elmo forms beliefs about the temperature in his
room by reading the thermometer on the wall. Unbeknownst
to Elmo, (a) the thermometer is actually broken and fluctuating
randomly within a certain range, while (b) there is someone in
the room next door who would adjust the reading to the actual
room temperature were Elmo to consult it.
Pritchard rightly points out that Elmo’s beliefs about the temperature
are safe. (The fact that the person in the room next door would adjust
the temperature in the right way were Elmo to consult the thermome-
ter ensures this.) At the same time, intuitively, Elmo’s beliefs about
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the temperature don’t qualify as knowledge. Pritchard’s diagnosis
is that Elmo’s cognitive success, his true belief, has too little to do
with his cognitive agency to count as knowing. More specifically,
Pritchard claims that Elmo’s “cognitive success is in no way a prod-
uct of his cognitive abilities” (Pritchard et al. 2010: 49), that it “has
nothing to do with the exercise of his cognitive abilities” (Pritchard
Forthcoming: 13). Given that Pritchard’s diagnosis is correct, adding
a competence condition to one’s account of knowledge appears to be
exactly what is needed.
Is it really correct that Elmo’s cognitive success is in no way a
product of his cognitive competence, that it has nothing to do with
the exercise of his cognitive abilities? Or, to be more precise, is it
correct that in any version of the case in which the intuition that
Elmo lacks knowledge is preserved, Elmo’s cognitive success is in no
way a product of his cognitive competence? I don’t think so. After
all, we may suppose that
Elmo consulted a thermometer in order to acquire a be-
lief about the temperature, not a lamp-post or a dog. We
may also suppose that he also wouldn’t have consulted a
thermometer that is clearly labelled as out of order or mal-
functioning. In addition, we may suppose that if the read-
ing had been obviously false, he would have been sensi-
tive to this fact. For instance, if the thermometer had read
minus twenty, then he would have treated the reading as
spurious.
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Nonetheless, given that the other features of the case are held fixed
(the thermometer is broken and suitably adjusted by a helper in the
room next door), the intuition that Elmo doesn’t know lingers.
Notice that the contribution of Elmo’s cognitive competences to
his cognitive success parallels the contribution of Rosita’s compe-
tences to her success almost exactly. As a result, the core problem
reappears for IC+S: Either the contribution of Rosita’s competences
is substantive enough to render her success to a significant degree
creditable to competence, but then so is the contribution of Elmo’s
competences. Or, alternatively, the contribution of Elmo’s compe-
tences isn’t substantive enough to render his success to a significant
degree creditable to competence, but then neither is the contribution
of Rosita’s competences. While Pritchard can handle either case, he
cannot get both cases right. The core problem for PC arises for IC+S
just the same.
This is not even the end of the problems for IC+S. In his Forthcom-
ing paper, Sosa raises a couple of further problem cases that affect ac-
counts of knowledge that, like IC+S, countenance a safety condition
in general. Since both of Sosa’s cases receive the same treatment by
his and my account (sections 4 and 5 below), I will here focus on one
case only:
Dreaming. Oscar is currently sitting at his desk and truly believes
this to be so. However, he might easily have been lying down
in bed dreaming that he is sitting at his desk.
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Intuitively, Oscar’s belief qualifies as knowledge. The threat arises
that the closeness of dreaming scenarios renders Oscar’s belief un-
safe. At nearby worlds at which Oscar is lying in bed dreaming that
he is sitting at his desk, he would believe falsely that he is sitting
at his desk. If Oscar’s belief is unsafe, by the lights of IC+S, it does
not qualify as knowledge. By incorporating a safety condition in his
account of knowledge, Pritchard threatens to make his account im-
plausibly demanding.
4 Pure competence manifestation virtue epistemology
4.1 . . . in outline
Sosa thinks his view, a pure competence manifestation virtue episte-
mology (PCM), can get us out of this pickle. Here is how: Sosa first
observes that performances with an aim can be evaluated in terms of
accuracy, whether they are successful, adroitness, whether they are
competent, and aptness, whether they are accurate because adroit,
successful because competent.
Competences, according to Sosa, are dispositions to perform well
in certain conditions and situations. More specifically, Sosa distin-
guishes between three components of competences: constitution (CO),
inner (IN) and situation (SI). In the case of archery competence, at
least the kind we are most familiar with, the constitution component
includes, I presume, certain basic cognitive and motor skills and the
ability to coordinate them, the inner component includes his being
awake and sober, and the situation component includes there being
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enough light and normal winds.6
The three components of competences place different constraints
on performances. An agent who doesn’t satisfy CO doesn’t even
have the competence. For instance, blind people don’t have archery
competences, at least not the kind we are most familiar with. Sup-
pose an agent satisfies CO. In a situation in which he doesn’t satisfy
IN, the agent isn’t in a position to perform competently; or, in other
words, he isn’t in a position to exercise his competence. When too
drunk archer A is no longer in a position to fire competent shots. An
agent who satisfies CO and IN may perform competently. He may
do so even if SI is not in place. B’s shot may be competent even if
it is diverted off target by strong winds. Sosa’s core idea is that a
performance is apt, its success manifests competence, only if in ad-
dition to CO and IN, SI is satisfied. Thus, B’s shot won’t be apt even
though it is competent and successful (suppose B has a helper who
is using a wind machine to get his shot back on target) because SI is
not satisfied: winds are not normal. As opposed to that, when C’s
competent shot hits the target in a case in which SI is in place, it may
be apt.7
6 Sosa (Forthcoming: 1), for a precursor see Sosa (2007: 86-7). In addition, Sosa
distinguishes between three corresponding levels of competence: the constitutional
competence, the seat of the skill, the inner competence, which combines the consti-
tutional and inner components, and the complete competence, which additionally
includes the situation component. Since, for the purposes of this paper at least,
the additional technical terminology is of little consequence and has the tendency
to obscure the differences with creditability accounts of the because relation, I will
try to avoid it whenever possible.
7 It is not hard to see how Sosa’s account of the because relation differs from
Pritchard’s. A success may be to a significant degree creditable to the exercise of
competence even though SI is not in place. For instance, this will be the case when
the person with the wind machine will assist only competently fired shots. Sosa
argues that his competence manifestation account of the because relation differs
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Sosa suggests to view beliefs as performances, performances that
aim at truth. As a result, they too can be evaluated in terms of accu-
racy, adroitness and aptness. According to Sosa,
PCM. Knowledge is apt belief, belief the truth of which manifests
competence.
Arguably, Sosa can get Landmark and Broken Thermometer right.
Consider Landmark. Rosita presumably has a disposition to acquire
true testimonial beliefs when awake, sober, sufficiently attentive etc.
(= IN) and the testifier doesn’t attempt to deceive her etc. (= SI).
Hence, by Sosa’s lights, she has a competence enabling her to receive
testimony. Moreover, presumably, (IN) and (SI) are satisfied in Land-
mark. As a result, when Rosita acquires a true belief on the basis of
testimony, her cognitive success plausibly manifests this competence.
That is to say, however, that Rosita’s belief is apt.
Contrast Broken Thermometer. Elmo’s has a disposition to acquire
true beliefs about the temperature by looking at thermometers when
awake, sober, sufficiently attentive etc. (= IN) and the thermometer is
functioning properly etc. (= SI). However, in Broken Thermometer, the
thermometer is not functioning properly. SI is not satisfied. Hence,
while Elmo’s true belief is competently formed (CO and IN are in
place), it does not manifest competence. His belief is not apt. So,
there is reason to think that Sosa can avoid the version of the core
problem IC+S encountered.
But now recall that there is still the original version of the prob-
from the primary creditability account in Sosa (2007: 86-7).
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lem, which arose from Fake Barns and Landmark. One might think
that Sosa can simply give the same account of Fake Barns as of Bro-
ken Thermometer. He could achieve this by maintaining that the situa-
tional component of Grover’s barn-spotting competence involves that
there be no indistinguishable fake barns in the area. However, Sosa
thinks that taking this route would be a mistake, or perhaps more ac-
curately, that he would make life unjustifiably easy for himself. After
all, Sosa points out, we have no similar requirements for other per-
formances. For instance, the fact that an archer might so easily have
been shooting in high winds doesn’t mean that his shots aren’t apt,
in which case SI must be satisfied, now that he is shooting in normal
winds. The thing to say here is that SI is satisfied but only fragilely,
in that it might easily not have been satisfied, not that it fails to be
satisfied. And the same goes for Grover’s barn-spotting competence.
(Forthcoming: 6)
So Sosa wants to grant that in Fake Barns SI is satisfied. But then,
since very plausibly Grover also satisfies IN, doesn’t the truth of his
belief manifest Grover’s competence? And if so, doesn’t Sosa fall
prey to the original problem for PC (according to which VE cannot
get both Fake Barns and Landmark right)? Sosa’s answers to these
questions are, respectively, “yes” and “no”. That is to say, Sosa ac-
knowledges that Grover’s true belief manifests competence. How-
ever, he still thinks that he can avoid the problem. His crucial move
is to explain away the intuition of ignorance here. He countenances
a distinction between animal knowledge (first-order knowledge or
first-order apt belief) and reflective knowledge (second-order knowl-
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edge or meta-apt belief) and argues that while beliefs of agents like
Grover constitute animal knowledge, they fail to qualify as reflective
knowledge.
Let’s shelve the details for a moment and look at the problem of
dreaming scepticism instead. Sosa needs to show that, in Dreaming,
Oscar’s perceptual beliefs qualify as knowledge. Notice, that it won’t
be enough to show that Oscar has animal knowledge but lacks re-
flective knowledge. After all, as Sosa is well aware, doing so means
jeopardising a wide range of our reflective knowledge and that is too
significant a concession to the sceptic. What Sosa needs to show is
that, in Fake Barns, Grover has animal knowledge but lacks reflective
knowledge, while, in Dreaming, Oscar has both animal and reflective
knowledge. Here is how he ventures to achieve this:
[When asleep,] we lose an essential inner component in
any case. Once asleep, we are in bad shape epistemically,
with a consequent loss of competence. But here’s the im-
portant point: [Oscar’s] incompetence when asleep is of no
relevance to whether he has the complete second-order compe-
tence when awake and alert. So, this is how [Oscar] is more
fortunate than [Grover]. This is why he attains a level of
knowledge denied to [Grover].8
Sosa seems to offer a fairly plausible view. It gets Landmark, Broken
8 (Sosa Forthcoming: 13). It may be worth noting that Sosa also considers
another way of arguing that Oscar but not Grover has the complete second-order
competence. However, the alternative rests on the highly controversial claim that
dreaming experiences have a special quality that distinguishes them from waking
experiences. Moreover, for present purposes, it suffices that Sosa has thinks this
explanation will do the trick.
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Thermometer, and Dreaming right. While he cannot give a fully chari-
table account of our intuition in Fake Barns, he can give what appears
to be a plausible alternative explanation of the intuition: Grover has
first-order or animal knowledge, but lacks second-order or reflective
knowledge.
4.2 . . . in trouble
Unfortunately, there are problems for Sosa as well. To see this con-
sider the following two cases:
Minimalist Art. Ernie is standing in front of a piece from a series of
ten monochrome paintings that are currently being exhibited at
the local art gallery and comes to believe that the canvass he is
looking at is red.
Conceptual Art. Bert is standing in front of a piece from a series of
ten monochrome paintings that are currently being exhibited at
the local art gallery and comes to believe that the canvass he is
looking at is red. Unbeknownst to Bert, he is looking at the only
red monochrome in a series of otherwise white monochromes
cleverly illuminated to look like red monochromes.
Here are my intuitions about the cases: Ernie’s belief qualifies as
knowledge but Bert’s doesn’t. How can Sosa explain this difference
in intuitions? Before answering this question, notice that Concep-
tual Art has the same structure as Fake Barns. Accordingly, Sosa will
want to explain the intuition of ignorance in Conceptual Art in the
same way as in Fake Barns: Bert has first-order knowledge but lacks
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second-order knowledge. Since, by Sosa’s light’s, Ernie also has first-
order knowledge, the obvious way for him to explain the difference
in intuitions between the two cases is that, unlike Bert, who has first-
order knowledge but lacks second-order knowledge, Ernie not only
has first-order knowledge but also second-order knowledge.
Unfortunately, there is reason to think that this won’t work for
Sosa. To see this, notice that both Ernie and Bert may lack second-
order knowledge for independent reasons. This may be the case if,
for instance, both Ernie and Bert have been given a drug that de-
grades specifically their reflective competences; or if they lack second-
order knowledge on anti-luminosity grounds9; or, perhaps, Ernie and
Bert are small children who have not developed the relevant reflec-
tive competences yet or animals who are simply not sufficiently cog-
nitively sophisticated to have the relevant reflective competences. In
any of these cases Ernie and Bert both lack second-order knowledge.
However, intuitively, Ernie does have (first-order) knowledge, while
Bert lacks it. So, the obvious way of explaining the difference in in-
tuition won’t work for Sosa.
In fact, things are worse for Sosa in at least two respects: first,
there appears to be no alternative explanation of the difference in in-
tuition available to Sosa. In particular, on pain of jeopardising his
explanation of the intuition of ignorance in Fake Barns, he cannot
appeal to an explanation in terms of a difference in first-order knowl-
edge. Second, it strikes me as highly plausible that whatever explains
the difference in intuitions here will also serve to explain the intuition
9 For more on luminosity see Williamson (2000: chs. 4,5).
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that Bert lacks knowledge. If that’s right, then Sosa’s explanation of
this intuition in terms of his distinction between animal and reflective
knowledge can no longer be expected to be correct either.10
5 Impure competence manifestation virtue epistemol-
ogy
Although Pritchard’s account and especially Sosa’s account come
close to the mark, there remain problems for both of them so that
neither account is ultimately satisfactory. Fortunately, along the way,
we have gathered the ingredients for a view that steers clear of the
problems on both sides. The view combines an impure version of
virtue epistemology with a competence manifestation account of the
because relation. Moreover, like Pritchard, it places an additional
safety requirement on knowledge (ICM+S). Roughly, according to
this this view,
ICM+S. Knowledge is safe, apt belief.
To begin with notice that this view (henceforth also “the safe-apt
view”) can claim the advantages of competence manifestation views
over explanatory salience views: Since knowledge requires apt belief,
that is, belief the truth of which manifests competence, just like Sosa’s
view, it gives the right predictions in Landmark and Broken Thermome-
ter (see section 4.1). Since it countenances a separate safety condition,
10 Notice that even if you don’t find these particular cases compelling, there is
reason to think that the problem remains. All that I need to generate it is a case in
which the agent has non-gettierised first-order knowledge, whilst lacking second-
order knowledge. The problem can then be generated by construing another case
that is in all respects like the first one except that the agent is also gettierised on
the first order (in, as it were, “the fake barn way”).
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just like Pritchard’s view, it passes the right verdict in Fake Barns (see
section 3.1). It can also explain the difference in intuitions between
Minimalist Art and Conceptual Art (see section 4.2). Ernie’s first-order
belief is not only apt but also safe: in his situation there are no white
canvasses illuminated to look red around. As a result, it is not as if he
could easily have believed falsely. As opposed to that, thanks to the
presence of the colourfully illuminated white canvasses, Bert’s first-
order belief, while apt, is unsafe. So, Ernie but not Bert has first-order
knowledge. Moreover, the view can, of course, allow that both Ernie
and Bert lack second-order knowledge for independent reasons.
What about Dreaming? Doesn’t the safe-apt view face the same
problem here as Pritchard’s IC+S did? It does. However, in his treat-
ment of the problem, Sosa has given us all we need to solve it. To see
this, recall Sosa’s argument that Oscar’s belief qualifies as reflective
knowledge:
[When asleep,] we lose an essential inner component in
any case. Once asleep, we are in bad shape epistemically,
with a consequent loss of competence. But here’s the im-
portant point: [Oscar’s] incompetence when asleep is of no
relevance to whether he has the complete second-order compe-
tence when awake and alert. So, this is how [Oscar] is more
fortunate than [Grover]. This is why he attains a level of
knowledge denied to [Grover]. (Sosa Forthcoming: 13)
Now, notice first that Sosa claims that dreaming results in loss of
competence. What Sosa means here is that dreaming results in loss of
20
what he calls inner competence (see n.6). Since I have avoided Sosa’s
technical terminology so far, I will try to continue to do so now. A
more intuitive way of describing what happens when asleep (and a
way that fits nicely with my statement of Sosa’s account competence
manifestation in section 4.1) is that Grover is no longer in a position to
perform competently; or, in other words, he is no longer in a position
to exercise his competence.
Crucially this point about not being positioned to exercise one’s
competence when asleep holds not only for the second-order com-
petences Sosa focuses on, but also for first-order perceptual compe-
tences. Once asleep, it is not just our reflective competences that we
are no longer in a position to exercise, our perceptual competences
are afflicted too. This point finds further support from Sosa’s own
description of the structure of perceptual competence. Here is what
he has to say about colour vision: “Here again the same structure is
found: a constitution component, including rods and cones; a con-
dition [= inner] component, including being awake and sober; and a
situation component, including adequate light.” (Sosa Forthcoming:
3, my emphasis) Sosa observes, correctly I believe, that being awake
is part of the inner component of colour vision competence. More-
over there is no reason to think that colour vision is special among
perceptual competences in this respect. On the contrary, it is highly
plausible that being awake features in the inner components of per-
ceptual competences in general. As a result, when asleep we are no
longer in a position to exercise our perceptual competences.
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At this point we are very close to establishing that the safe-apt
view can avoid the threat of dreaming scepticism. Recall that the
safety requirement rules against error at nearby possible worlds. Sa-
fety is thus a modal condition on knowledge. Ever since Nozick
(1981), champions of modal conditions in general are very clear that
the relevant conditions afford a further index to methods of belief for-
mation. In the case of safety, it is very plausible that safety requires
not avoidance of error at all nearby possible worlds but only at those
nearby possible worlds at which the agent acquires her belief via the
same method as in the actual world.11 Now, we only need to equate
the methods of the safety condition with (exercises of) the compe-
tences of the competence condition and, voilà, our perceptual beliefs
while awake can be safe in the relevant sense required for knowledge
even if we might easily have been asleep and dreaming instead.12
After all, as we have seen, at worlds at which we are asleep we are
in no position to exercise our perceptual competences. As a result,
we do not use the same method of belief formation in those worlds.
The fact that we believe falsely at those worlds does not impugn the
safety of our beliefs in the actual world.
6 Diagnosis
There is thus reason to believe that the safe-apt view can accommo-
date all intuitions in the above cases, whereas its main competitors—
11 Pritchard also advocates such an index to methods e.g. in Pritchard (2005:
ch. 6.2).
12 This result can also be secured with Sosa’s technical terminology in place. In
this case the methods of the safety condition need to be equated with Sosa’s inner
competences.
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PC, IC+S and PCM—struggle to accommodate at least some of them.
At the same time, one might think that the safe-apt view is at a dis-
advantage vis-à-vis pure versions of VE. The safe apt view postulates
two conditions on knowledge where pure versions of VE postulate
only one. Thus the safe-apt view is more complex and less elegant
than pure versions of VE. In view of the fact that some of the relevant
cases are fairly recherché, one might argue that it is not clear that the
intuitive advantage should clinch it for the safe apt view.
Of course, the additional complexity would not count against the
safe-apt view if we had independent reason to believe that it should
be there, i.e. if we had independent reason to believe that the con-
cept of knowledge should feature both a safety and a competence
condition. On the contrary, any such reason would provide further
confirmation that the analysis of the cases offered by the safe-apt
view is correct.
Pritchard offers an argument to this effect that appeals to the func-
tion of the concept of knowledge. As I argue elsewhere (Author 2012)
in more detail, Pritchard’s specific argument fails. At the same time, I
do believe that the general strategy is promising and, in said paper, I
offer an alternative to Pritchard’s argument, which I will here briefly
rehearse.
The thesis about the function of the concept of knowledge from
which the argument starts is that that the concept of knowledge
serves to mark when a given agent is entitled to inquire no further
into a given question.13 Now notice that we sometimes want to say
13 I defend this thesis against its main competitor (due to Edward Craig (1990)
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that an agent is entitled to inquire no further when we when we our-
selves do not know the truth about the question. This may happen
in cases like the following: D is interested in the question whether
the surface E is currently looking at is red but does not himself have
a belief on the issue. In this situation D may want point out that E is
entitled to inquire no further into the issue. By the present hypothe-
sis, the concept of knowledge will allow him to achieve this. And so
it does: D can attribute to E knowledge whether the surface is red.
Let’s now ask ourselves what sorts of conditions would govern a
concept that serves this function and is applicable when we ourselves
don’t know the truth about the question.
To begin with, we would expect it to respect a modal condition:
Were we to find out that the attributee might so easily have been
mistaken, we could not attribute to him an entitlement to inquire no
further into the issue. Were D to be informed that nearly all of the
surfaces in the environment that appear red are in fact non-red (i.e.
E = Bert in Conceptual Art), D would have to withdraw his attribution
of entitlement to E to pursue the issue no further. What’s more, if D
knew that E’s answer to the question of the colour of the surface is
based only on E’s taking appearances at face value, D would have to
deny that E is entitled to pursue the question no further. D would
have to say that E doesn’t know whether the surface is red.
At the same time, we would also expect a concept with the envis-
aged function to respect a competence condition: Were we to find out
that the attributee does not have the relevant cognitive competence,
and appealed to by Pritchard in his unsuccessful argument) in Author (2011).
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we could not attribute to him an entitlement to inquire no further.
Were D to be informed that E is red-green colour blind (i.e. E =
a colour-blind version of Ernie in Minimalist Art), D would have to
withdraw his attribution of entitlement to E to pursue the issue no
further. What’s more, if D knew that E’s answer to the question of
the colour of the surface is based only on exercising his competence
to discern colours, D would have to deny that E is entitled to pursue
the question no further. D would have to say that E doesn’t know
whether the surface is red.
It is not hard to see that these two conditions are independent
of one another. In the first case D would have to withdraw his at-
tribution of knowledge/deny E knowledge even when E exercises a
highly reliable competence to tell colours apart. In the second case, D
would have to withdraw his attribution of knowledge/deny E knowl-
edge even when the surface E is looking at could not have been any
colour other than red. If this is correct, then we have independent
reason to think that the concept of knowledge should feature both
conditions the safe-apt view countenances. The additional complex-
ity the safe apt view countenances does not count against the view
and the analysis of the cases offered receives further confirmation.
7 Conclusion
There is thus reason to think that the safe-apt view can secure the
benefits, whilst avoiding the costs of all of PC, IC+S and PCM. By
countenancing a separate safety condition, it can avoid the core prob-
lem as it arose for PC and successfully explain the difference in intu-
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itions in the cases of Ernie and Bert. By construing the because rela-
tion of the virtue component in terms of competence manifestation,
it avoids the version of the core problem that arose for Pritchard’s
IC+S. By acknowledging the need for an index to methods in the
safety condition and by identifying the methods with (exercises of)
the competences of the virtue component, it can accommodate the
intuition in Dreamer. Finally, a plausible thesis about the function of
the concept of knowledge can be used to provide independent reason
to believe that the concept of knowledge should have the structure
the safe-apt view claims it to have. We have before us, I submit, a
promising view of the nature of knowledge.
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